Utah Secure Pork Supply Plan

A Swine Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Continuity of Business Plan for Industry

SUMMARY PLAN

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1.0 INTRODUCTION

Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD), Classical Swine Fever (CSF), and African Swine Fever (ASF) are highly contagious foreign animal diseases (FADs) in swine. These diseases are present in many other countries and cause severe animal production losses. Industry, state and federal officials, and swine disease experts are working collaboratively to develop response plans if one of these diseases infects susceptible species in the United States.

Response strategies to control the spread of disease include:

- Stopping the movement of susceptible animals
- Stopping the movement of animal products, feed, and vehicles
- Rapid identification of infected animals
- Strategic depopulation of infected animals
- Proper disposal of infected animals and items (e.g. feed and manure)
- Vaccination

The State Veterinarian and USDA-APHIS-VS have the authority and responsibility to establish regulatory Control Areas around FAD-infected premises and to manage movement of animals and animal products within, into, and out of the Control Area.

1.1 PURPOSE

The purpose of the Utah Secure Pork Supply Plan (UT SPS Plan) is to provide a plan for pork premises within a Control Area with no evidence of FAD infection to move their animals to slaughter and processing facilities or to other production premises. This document is an overview of the SPS Plan and available resources for producers, processors, haulers, and regulatory officials. The goal is to facilitate pork industry preparedness for, and response to, an FMD, CSF, or ASF outbreak within the state of Utah.

1.2 COLLABORATION

The Utah SPS Plan is based on the national SPS Plan, found at securepork.org, and was developed by UDAF in cooperation with USDA, Utah Cooperative Extension, the Utah Pork Producers, processing plants, and rendering companies. The Utah SPS Plan provides guidance only. In an actual outbreak, decisions will need to be made by the State Veterinarian, USDA, and the industry based on the unique needs of that outbreak.

1.3 RESPONSE GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS

1.3.1 STRATEGIC PLANS FOR FMD, CSF, AND ASF

The following Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plans were created by USDA:

- Foot and Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book
- Classical Swine Fever Response Plan: The Red Book
- African Swine Fever Disease Response Strategy
- Ready Reference Guides

1.3.2 GUIDELINES

USDA has also developed guidelines for:

- Phases and types of outbreaks of FMD, CSF, and ASF
- Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing activities during an outbreak
- Quarantine and Movement Controls during an outbreak
- Continuity of Business Guidelines
- Data Management

1.4 PLAN UPDATES

The UT SPS Plan will be reviewed by UDAF on a routine basis or when there are significant changes to the National Secure Pork Supply Plan.

2.0 MANAGED MOVEMENT DURING AN FAD RESPONSE

2.1 ZONE AND PREMISES DEFINITIONS

During an outbreak, regulatory officials will set up zones around infected premises and implement movement restrictions within those zones. Premises will be given designations based on the threat of infection on that premises.

2.1.1 ZONE DEFINITIONS

Zone/Area	Definition
Infected Zone	Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Premises.
Buffer Zone	Zone that immediately surrounds an Infected Zone or a Contact Premises.
Control Area	Consists of an Infected Zone and a Buffer Zone
Surveillance Zone	Zone outside and along the border of a Control Area.
Free Area	Area not included in any Control Area.

Vaccination Zone	Emergency Vaccination Zone classified as either a Containment Vaccination Zone (typically inside a Control Area) or a Protection Vaccination Zone (typically outside a Control Area). This may be a secondary zone designation.



2.1.2 PREMISES DEFINITIONS

Premises	Definition	Zone
Infected Premises	Premises where presumptive positive case or confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, FMD case definition, and international standards.	Infected Zone
Contact Premises	Premises with susceptible animals that may have been exposed to FMD, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited to exposure to animals, animal products, fomites, or people from Infected Premises.	Infected Zone, Buffer Zone
Suspect Premises	Premises under investigation due to the presence of susceptible animals reported to have clinical signs compatible with FMD. This is intended to be a short-term premises designation.	Infected Zone, Buffer Zone, Surveillance Zone, Vaccination Zone

At-Risk Premises	Premises that have susceptible animals, but none of those susceptible animals have clinical signs compatible with FMD. Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. At-Risk Premises seek to move susceptible animals or products within the Control Area by permit. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises.	Infected Zone, Buffer Zone
Monitored Premises	Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected Premises, Contact Premises, or Suspect Premises. Only At-Risk Premises are eligible to become Monitored Premises. Monitored Premises meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move susceptible animals or products out of the Control Area by permit.	Infected Zone, Buffer Zone
Free Premises	Premises outside of a Control Area and not a Contact or Suspect Premises.	Surveillance Zone, Free Area
Vaccinated Premises	Premises where emergency vaccination has been performed. This may be a secondary premises designation.	Containment Vaccination Zone, Protection Vaccination Zone

2.1.3 ELIGIBILITY OF PREMISES TO REQUEST A MOVEMENT PERMIT

Only At Risk and Monitored premises with in a control area are eligible to request a movement permit to move their animals to slaughter. At-Risk premises may be required to become a Monitored premises prior to receiving the movement permit.

2.2 IMPORTANCE OF BIOSECURITY

An effective strategy for managing FAD outbreaks in swine involves stopping movement of pigs and their products (e.g. meat, semen, and embryos) until regulatory officials believe they can be moved safely. Movement controls will be put in place for the regulatory Control Areas to limit the risk of disease spread by animals, animal products, vehicles, and other equipment. Movement within, into, and out of a Control Area will be by permit only; these permits are issued based on the risk posed by movement of that item and the ability to meet permit requirements.

Production and processing sites and haulers that follow the guidance in this plan before an outbreak will be better prepared to request a movement permit. At the beginning of

an FAD outbreak, it may take weeks to months before regulatory officials can be confident that movement of animals and products will not contribute to the disease spread.

The SPS Plan includes guidance for producers, transporters, processors, renderers, and officials for animal and product movement permits. There may be additional requirements depending on the scope and other characteristics of the outbreak. Following the guidance in the SPS Plan could enable more rapid resumption of animal movements.

2.3 RESPONSIBILITIES

2.3.1 STATE VETERINARIAN'S RESPONSIBILITY

It is the State Veterinarian's responsibility during an outbreak to detect, control, and contain the FAD as quickly as possible so it can be eradicated. Incident command will issue permits for the movement of animals and animal products within, into, and out of the Control Areas based on the unique characteristics of the outbreak, the status of the premises, and the potential risks of the type of movement.

2.3.2 PRODUCER'S RESPONSIBILITY

It is the producer's responsibility during an FAD outbreak to implement biosecurity and other measures to keep their animals from becoming infected. Producers will need to prove to regulatory officials that they are not contributing to the spread of the FAD nor putting their own animals at risk of exposure. Premises that have prepared and implemented enhanced biosecurity plans are more likely to be allowed to move animals during an outbreak. Producers should be ready to provide evidence that they have effectively implemented all the enhanced biosecurity measures recommended in the SPS biosecurity checklist when they request an animal movement permit.

Producers should also have contingency plans to manage their premises if they are not allowed to move pigs for several weeks. It may take days to weeks for Incident Command teams to conduct appropriate surveillance to determine the extent of the outbreak.

2.3.3 TRANSPORTER'S AND RENDERER'S RESPONSIBILITY

Transport and rendering vehicles and drivers represent a moderate to high risk of spreading FAD viruses unless strict biosecurity procedures are followed. Cross-contamination may occur at packing/processing plants between drivers and vehicles through contact with manure or animal products. Control measures focused on preventing the spread of FMD, ASF, or CSF must be implemented during an outbreak.

Transporters must also follow all biosecurity procedures put in place by the production facility as well as develop their own biosecurity procedures for cleaning and disinfection of trailers and equipment. Producers who act as their own transporter must meet both producer and transporter biosecurity requirements.

2.3.4 PROCESSOR'S RESPONSIBILITY

Packing plant employees, truck drivers, and others who contact animals or their body fluids must observe proper biosecurity protocols to avoid transmitting the disease virus to susceptible animals when they leave the plant. All personnel must be instructed on biosecurity steps to follow before and after leaving the plant.

3.0 PRE-EVENT PREPAREDNESS

During an FAD outbreak, premises in a Control Area that need to move animals with no evidence of an FAD infection may need to comply with the SPS Plan guidelines to request and receive a movement permit. Additional requirements may also be implemented depending on the scope and other characteristics of the outbreak. Interstate movements may also need to meet outbreak-specific conditions in addition to existing entry requirements. Preparation for an FAD outbreak by following the guidelines in this plan will decrease the risk of disease spread and facilitate the eventual issuing of movement permits.

There are four major recommendations for premises preparing for an FAD outbreak:

3.1 PRODUCER PARTICIPATION

3.1.1 LOCATION VERIFICATION (PREMISES IDENTIFICATION)

Every premises needs to have a Premises ID number from UDAF. The Premises ID is a unique code assigned to a premises with a verified physical address and

latitude/longitude coordinates. If you have multiple or adjoining locations with animals, contact the State Veterinarian's Office to determine how many Premises ID numbers you need. Premises more than ¼ mile apart should have different Premises ID numbers. When animals on a premises become infected, all premises with the same Premises ID number will be considered to be infected.

Producers and processors can contact the State Veterinarian's Office for their Premises ID number, and then validate it with the National Pork Board at lms.pork.org/premises to ensure the information on file accurately represents the location of the animals. If the address on file does not accurately represent the location, contact the State Veterinarian's Office. Validated Premises ID numbers speed up communication and response during an outbreak.

During an outbreak, the Premises ID can be used to notify producers if they are in a regulatory Control Area, allow producers to request a movement permit, and help link diagnostic test results and other important information to a premises.

3.1.2 IMPLEMENT ENHANCED BIOSECURITY

3.1.2.1 DESIGNATE A BIOSECURITY MANAGER

A biosecurity manager is an individual assigned by the owner or manager to develop a site-specific enhanced biosecurity plan with the assistance of the herd veterinarian and to ensure that all individuals who enter the site have biosecurity training or are aware of biosecurity measures for that site. The biosecurity manager should have the authority to ensure compliance with protocols and take corrective actions as needed.

3.1.2.2 WRITTEN SITE-SPECIFIC ENHANCED BIOSECURITY PLAN

Stringent biosecurity measures are essential to prevent the entry of virus into each herd. Producers should work with their veterinarian to develop a site-specific biosecurity plan that addresses each item in the checklist found in the *Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Pork Production Biosecurity: Animals Raised Indoors.* The biosecurity measures listed in the checklist will also help prevent the entry and spread of domestic diseases.

A checklist for pigs raised outdoors is being developed. The Biosecurity

Checklist, templates for biosecurity plans, and training materials are available on the SPS website: www.securepork.org.

The biosecurity plan should include a map of the premises with all entrances, parking areas, buildings, and other relevant areas marked. The map should include the Perimeter Buffer Area and the Line(s) of Separation, defined below.



From the U.S. Pork Industry Guide to the Secure Pork Supply Plan

A biosecurity plan can only work if EVERY person on the site follows it ALL of the time. This requires training and education. To build a culture of biosecurity on the farm, everyone on the farm must understand why certain procedures matter and the potential consequences if they are not followed. Effective training can be done through one-on-one or group sessions – whatever works best for the

premises.

Some production sites may already have biosecurity training for new employees or annual training requirements for all employees. There are biosecurity training videos, signs, posters, training forms, and other resources available in English and Spanish at securepork.org. Some of the materials available are listed in Appendix A.

3.1.2.3 DEFINE THE PERIMETER BUFFER AREA

The Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA) is a boundary around the buildings on the premises to limit movement of the virus near animal housing by separating on-farm activities from contact with off-farm vehicles, equipment, and people. Caretakers should perform their duties within the PBA, and routine deliveries should occur outside the PBA.

Entry to the PBA should be restricted to controlled access points. Each access point needs to be clearly marked with a sign and protected with a barrier (e.g. cable, gate, or rope). Vehicles moving through the PBA must be cleaned and then disinfected. All employees, visitors, and equipment moving through a PBA access point must follow biosecurity measures to prevent the introduction or spread of disease.

3.1.2.4 DEFINE THE LINE OF SEPARATION

The Line of Separation (LOS) is a boundary to prevent movement of virus into areas where susceptible animals can be exposed. For pigs raised indoors, the LOS will be the walls of the building housing the animals. For pigs raised outdoors, the LOS may include a buffer area around the outside pens. The LOS needs to be defined in the biosecurity plan and clearly marked on the premises.

Animals, employees, and items should only cross the LOS through clearly marked and controlled LOS access points and follow appropriate biosecurity measures. Each LOS access point should be clearly marked with a sign that can be understood by all entering. All movement of animals, equipment, and people across the LOS should be recorded and available for review upon request.

3.1.3 SURVEILLANCE AND SAMPLE COLLECTION

During an outbreak, swine premises may be asked to submit samples for disease surveillance. Individuals at each production site should be trained to recognize signs of FMD, CSF, and ASF in their herds and collect samples from the animals for laboratory analysis. Samples include oral fluid collection, nasal swabs, and blood. Videos and handouts in English and Spanish are available to assist in training at www.securepork.org/training-materials.php. Training for sample collection should be done by a federally accredited veterinarian. The designated employees should periodically practice collecting samples, and sample collection supplies should be stored on the premises. Record keeping templates are available for documenting health observations and feed and water intake.

Incident Command will determine what type of surveillance is required for a premises to demonstrate freedom from disease. The document Surveillance Guidance to Support the SPS Continuity of Business Plan during an FMD, CSF, or ASF Outbreak discusses surveillance options for swine premises. The diagnostic tests and sampling protocols may change during an outbreak based on new knowledge and technology.

Potential surveillance options during an outbreak of FMD, CSF, or ASF may include:

- Epidemiological questionnaires (see sample questionnaire in Appendix C)
- Serological surveillance (testing blood for antibodies to the virus to indicate infection or exposure)
- Virological surveillance (testing oral fluid, nasal swabs, or blood for the virus)
- Periodic inspection by a federally accredited veterinarian or government veterinarian
- Active Observational Surveillance by premises employees that have training as Swine Health Monitors (records of daily visual observations and findings)

3.1.4 DATA MANAGEMENT

At the beginning of an outbreak, premises in a Control Area will be required to provide records to Incident Command to identify if the premises had potential exposure to the disease. These records can include movement of animals, feed, supplies, equipment, personnel, and visitors. In addition, producers may be asked to provide records of the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of haulers, employees, feed suppliers, and any other visitors to the premises. This information will be used to determine the scope of the outbreak. The Secure Pork Supply

Practice Questionnaire can give producers an idea of the information needed in an outbreak.

Tracking movement information prior to an outbreak helps to ensure that producers will be better prepared to provide information to regulatory officials when requested during an outbreak. It can also speed up trace-back and trace-forward investigations for animal and vehicle movement at the start of an outbreak.

3.2 TRANSPORTER, RENDERER, PROCESSOR, AND PACKER PARTICIPATION

Transporters, renderers, and processors play a critical part in safe transport, processing of pigs, and disposal of inedible materials in the face of a FAD outbreak. Movement permits will only be issued when the State Veterinarian and Incident Command are provided assurance that transporters, renderers, and processors are not contributing to disease spread through proper biosecurity plans and procedures. Transporters, renderers, and processors are also responsible for maintaining movement information for trace-back and trace-forward procedures.

3.2.1 TRANSPORTER GUIDANCE

Transporters should work with producers and regulatory officials to develop site-specific biosecurity standard operating procedures that cover the following: (1) over-the-road transport in a control area, (2) procedures for unloading pigs at the farm of origin, (3) controlling swine premises access: line of separation and controlled access points, (4) off-loading at a processing plant, (5) cleaning and disinfection of vehicles before leaving the premises and after off-loading, (6) approved disinfectants for FMD, ASF, and CSF viruses, and (7) personal protective equipment (PPE).

During an outbreak, transporters must:

- Provide contact information, including personal and company information to regulatory officials
- Provide vehicle ID and route details (premises name, number of premises in load)
- Follow premises and transporter biosecurity procedures, including:
    - Site-specific line of separation
    - PPE requirements if leaving the vehicle
    - Site-specific loading procedures
    - Avoid contact with farm personnel and manure

    - Minimize manure spread during transport
- Comply with State Veterinarian-approved traffic routes, if in place
- Communicate with the premises, processing plant, and regulatory officials to ensure all procedures in place are followed

Before an outbreak, transporters should create:

- Mechanism for training on biosecurity for drivers
- Mechanism for working with swine production facilities to utilize site-specific biosecurity procedures
- Swine unloading SOPs in cooperation with processors
- Plan to access necessary supplies
- Communication plan with premises, processing plants, and regulatory officials

3.2.2 RENDERER GUIDANCE

This plan only covers the transport of inedible materials from processing plants to rendering. Additional guidance will be developed in a separate document for the transport of animal carcasses to rendering.

Because of testing limitations, it is possible for animals to be permitted to move to slaughter that have become infected after the last screening test but are not yet clinical. Many large packing plants have on-site rendering available for inedible products, which destroys any virus in those products. Smaller plants contract with rendering companies to haul away and render the inedible products. Rendering companies should develop biosecurity procedures to minimize the possibility of spreading virus from the rendering trucks.

Rendering companies should work with processors and regulatory officials to develop site-specific biosecurity standard operating procedures that cover the following: (1) over-the-road transport of inedible materials to a rendering plant, (2) off-loading at the rendering plant, (3) cleaning and disinfection of vehicles after leaving a processor and after off-loading, (4) approved disinfectants for FMD, ASF, and CSF viruses, and (5) personal protective equipment (PPE). They should also provide training on biosecurity for drivers, have a plan to access necessary supplies, and have a communication plan with processors and regulatory officials.

During an outbreak, renderers must:

- Provide contact information, including personal and company information, to regulatory officials
- Provide vehicle ID and route details, including the names and locations of all premises visited during a route
- Follow processor and company biosecurity procedures
- Comply with State Veterinarian-approved traffic routes, if in place
- Communicate with the premises, processing plant, and regulatory officials to ensure all procedures in place are followed

3.2.3 PROCESSOR GUIDANCE

FMD, CSF, and ASF do not cause disease in people, so they are not public health or food safety concerns. Animals that pass ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection by USDA FSIS are safe and wholesome for human consumption. Allowing healthy animals in a Control Area to go to slaughter reduces the number of susceptible animals in a Control Area, and can help eliminate virus amplification and disease spread.

Processor Components:

- Premises ID number from UDAF and/or Federal Premises ID from USDA
- Facility
    - Traffic patterns on plant premises must be followed
    - Record of all vehicle and personnel movements into and out of the plant
    - Controlled access to facility unloading area
    - Cleaning and disinfection station(s) in place with waste water management (if necessary)
- Personnel must follow procedures to prevent the spread of possibly contaminated materials (e.g. mud, manure, blood, tissues) from susceptible species
- Follow all guidelines put in place by the State Veterinarian to prevent disease spread

Processing plants must create biosecurity procedures for:

- Personnel that contact swine to avoid transporting any possibly contaminated material to/from the plant on their vehicles or clothing

- Controlled access to the unloading area
- Transporter and renderer cleaning and disinfection (with wastewater plan if necessary)
- Avoiding cross-contamination of other vehicles, people, or equipment

Processors must communicate with producers, transporters, renderers, customers, and regulatory officials. They must provide documentation to producers that plant procedures and biosecurity are in place and acceptable to the State Veterinarian. During an outbreak, processors must collect movement permits from transporters or producers delivering pigs from a Control Area. Incident Command should be notified if permits are not received from producers in a Control Area.

3.3 DATA MANAGEMENT

UDAF shall collect, store, and maintain information on pre-event biosecurity assessments and the results of those assessments. The data is protected under State law that governs the confidentiality of producers' data.

Data sharing, notification of relevant parties, communication channels, and data security:

- The producer's name, location, contact information, and permit numbers for movement will be provided only to individuals that require this information to implement procedures of the Utah SPS plan during a FAD outbreak and shall be included on the permit.
- Permitting information will be made available only to emergency management personnel involved in the disease response activities, animal health officials in other cooperating states, and with federal animal health officials upon request, provided the Utah state law governing the confidentiality of the information is not violated.

4.0 REQUESTING A MOVEMENT PERMIT DURING AN OUTBREAK

4.1 REQUIREMENTS FOR MOVEMENT OF SWINE TO PROCESSING

During a FAD outbreak, the following permitting guidance applies to swine production facilities within a Control Area:

1. All swine producers will implement their site-specific enhanced biosecurity plans;

biosecurity protocols will be enforced within the Control Area.

2. The State Veterinarian will allow permitted movement of pigs from premises with no evidence of infection with the FAD to processing according to State, regional, and national SPS plans.
3. All swine producers within a Control Area will complete a FAD Epidemiology Questionnaire with a FAD Investigator. A sample questionnaire is in Appendix C.

4.2 PREMISES INFORMATION REQUIRED FOR A PERMIT

The following information is required whenever requesting a movement permit:

- Permit Class (movement within, into, or out of a Control Area)
- Permit Reason (why you want to move animals/products)
- Origin Premises ID
- Destination Premises ID
- Items Permitted (category of what is moving – feed, animals, manure, etc.)
- Item Class (specifically what is moving – e.g. boars to slaughter)
- Duration of Permit (movement date range)

Destination premises must sign a statement that they understand the risk of accepting animals from the regulatory Control Area.

4.3 ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTATION FOR PERMITTED MOVEMENT

Regulatory Officials may require additional documentation when they receive a movement permit request. This documentation may be attached to the permit request. The documentation may include, but is not limited to:

- Epidemiological Questionnaire
- A completed copy of the Biosecurity Checklist and the site-specific biosecurity plan
- Written assurance by the producer of compliance with the Biosecurity Checklist
- Documentation of verification of compliance by a third party
- Documentation of normal health status of animals at that site (such as swine health monitoring documents or a certificate of veterinary inspection by an accredited veterinarian)
- Diagnostic testing results – must include Premises ID number on submission form
- Statement from the destination that they understand and accept the risks associated with receiving the animals

4.4 REVIEW OF PERMIT REQUESTS

Completed movement permit requests will be reviewed by Incident Command and will either be accepted or rejected. If the request is for movement out of Utah across state lines, and the permit is approved by UDAF, the destination state may approve or reject the permit. Destination premises may also reject a permit request.

If approved, the producer will receive the approved permit from UDAF or Incident Command. The permitted movement must comply with all the requirements on the permit.

4.5 RESCINDING MOVEMENT PERMITS

Permits may be rescinded for violating or not adequately implementing biosecurity procedures. Failure to complete, or produce completed, daily herd health inspection records may result in rescinding movement permits. Reinspections for biosecurity reasons will include a full biosecurity assessment and must be passed before a permit can be re-issued.

Permits will be rescinded if inspections by qualified animal health professionals under the direction of the State Veterinarian identify clinical signs consistent with an FAD. The farm will then be identified as a Suspect Premises. The permit may be reinstated when sufficient information is provided to the State Veterinarian to determine that the farm is no longer a Suspect Premises.

Permits will be rescinded if laboratory tests indicate FAD infection in one or more animals on the premises. The premises will then be identified as an Infected Premises.

4.6 JUST-IN-TIME PREPARATION

If FMD, CSF, or ASF is diagnosed within Utah, premises that are within a Control Area, and possibly within other parts of the state, will be required to obtain a permit to move pigs to slaughter. Producers who have completed and met all pre-event preparedness will be able to obtain permits more quickly than those who have not.

Producers, transporters, renderers, or processors that have not participated in pre-event preparedness will need to implement appropriate biosecurity procedures in order to obtain movement permits. In addition, adequate surveillance will need to be performed by trained staff and all pertinent records will need to be maintained and shared with the State Veterinarian. Producers, transporters, renderers, and processors must meet all the requirements listed in Section 3.0: Pre-Event Preparedness.

5.0 STATE AND AGENCY COLLABORATION

UDAF has Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) with other states and agencies to manage the movement of animals and animal products and aid in disease response activities within the State and across state borders.

APPENDIX A: SECURE PORK SUPPLY PLAN BIOSECURITY TRAINING

The following videos and materials are available in English and Spanish from the Secure Pork Supply website (www.securepork.org), and can provide farm workers with some of the information they need to be part of the herd health protection team. Keep records of all biosecurity training, especially if it is specified in the biosecurity plan.

BIOSECURITY TRAINING VIDEOS

1. *Introduction to Biosecurity:* Why is it important to follow biosecurity measures?
2. *Do Not Bring Disease to the Site:* Biosecurity measures to follow to avoid bringing disease to a production site.
3. *Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA):* What is the PBA and what are the biosecurity measures to follow when entering the PBA?
4. *Line of Separation (LOS):* What is the LOS and what are the biosecurity measures to follow when crossing the LOS?
5. *Biosecure Bench Entry*

BIOSECURITY SIGNS

- Do Not Enter – Cross Only At Biosecure Entry Point
- Authorized Personnel Only
- Biosecure Entry Ahead

BIOSECURITY AND DISEASE POSTERS

- Producers and Employees: How to Protect Your Herd
- Attention Visitors: Visitors Are A Potential Biosecurity Risk
- Foot and Mouth Disease In Pigs: Progression of Lesions
- Classical Swine Fever (CSF): A Threat To The US Pork Industry
- African Swine Fever (ASF): A Threat To The US Pork Industry

APPENDIX B: BIOSECURITY CHECKLISTS

APPENDIX C: SECURE PORK SUPPLY PRACTICE EPIDEMIOLOGY QUESTIONNAIRE

Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Pork Production Biosecurity: Animals Raised Indoors

August 2017

Target Audience

This checklist and corresponding Information Manual for Enhanced Biosecurity are written for pork production sites where the animals are raised in enclosed animal buildings. The biosecurity measures apply to:

- Sites with several buildings or just one as long as all the pigs are raised indoors.
    - This includes sites with other susceptible species (e.g. cattle, sheep, and goats) kept on the premises.
- All individuals delivering to, servicing, or working on the site including family members and/or non-family employees responsible for animal care and husbandry.
- Sites that have **never been infected with or vaccinated for** foot and mouth disease (FMD), classical swine fever (CSF), and African swine fever (ASF).

Introduction

In the event of a foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak in the United States (U.S.), maintaining business continuity for the pork industry is critical to the agricultural economy, food security, as well as animal health and well-being. The goal of the Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan is to provide a workable business continuity plan for pork producers that have pigs with no evidence of the FAD infection and associated industries that is credible to Responsible Regulatory Officials (local, state, tribal, and federal officials, as appropriate). In an actual FAD outbreak, decisions will be made by Responsible Regulatory Officials based on the unique characteristics of each outbreak.

During an FAD outbreak, it is the producer's responsibility to keep their animals from becoming infected, focusing on what they can control on their site. Biosecurity approaches are both structural and operational. Structural biosecurity is built into the physical construction and maintenance of a facility. Operational biosecurity involves management practices designed to prevent the introduction and spread of disease agents onto or off of the production site. An FAD will test the effectiveness of operational biosecurity practices because successful implementation of these practices depends on the awareness and behavior of individuals on the site.

The three foreign animal diseases of concern for the SPS Plan are 1) foot and mouth disease (FMD), 2) African swine fever (ASF), and 3) classical swine fever (CSF), also known as hog cholera. All three diseases are highly contagious and have a high impact on animal health and international trade; however, none of these diseases pose a food safety or public health concern.

Existing biosecurity plans for pork production sites may offer protection against endemic diseases but heightened precautions are needed for FADs. The enhanced biosecurity recommendations outlined in this document are based on the known exposure routes for the three FADs of concern. This document emphasizes four concepts that all pork production sites must implement to help protect their animals from endemic diseases and to be prepared in the event of an FAD outbreak in the U.S.:

1. A Biosecurity Manager,
2. A written site-specific enhanced biosecurity plan,
3. A defined Perimeter Buffer Area, and
4. A defined Line of Separation.

This enhanced biosecurity checklist and the corresponding Information Manual for Enhanced Biosecurity can be used to develop a site-specific, written, enhanced biosecurity plan. All pork production sites must designate a Biosecurity Manager; this is item number 1 in the checklist below. The Biosecurity Manager develops the enhanced biosecurity plan PRIOR TO an outbreak; the plan addresses items 2-10 on this checklist. The biosecurity plan describes the scope of the operation, contains forms for documentation of training and signatures, explanations of procedures and signage used on the premises, and protocols written and communicated effectively in languages that are fully understood by the individuals responsible for implementation.

The biosecurity plan should describe the strategy for how each item could be implemented (supplies needed, changes in management practices, etc.). A majority of the biosecurity measures in the biosecurity checklist should be implemented even in the absence of an FAD outbreak to prevent entry and spread of domestic diseases. If producers have not implemented all of the items in the biosecurity checklist (such as a Cleaning & Disinfection Station at the entrance to the Perimeter Buffer Area) prior to the outbreak, they should implement them immediately when an FAD is detected in the U.S., Mexico, or Canada. If their production site is located in an FAD Control Area, Responsible Regulatory Officials will likely require that all of the items on the checklist, and possibly others, be implemented before animal movement is permitted.

Scope of Biosecurity Plan

Each premises must have its own biosecurity plan. Begin by defining your premises, clearly describing the animals (all species) and animal housing associated with the premises. Animals connected to the operation but reared at another site and accessed via a public road may be considered a separate premises, have a separate Premises Identification Number (PIN), and therefore, a separate biosecurity plan. Biosecurity plans for premises owned/managed similarly may have significant overlap. A PIN will be required to request movement permits during an outbreak. A PIN includes a valid 911 address and a set of matching coordinates (latitude and longitude) reflecting the actual location of the animals on the premises. Request a PIN from the office of your State Animal Health Official.

Other businesses, animal or non-animal related, operated from the same premises should also be accounted for in the biosecurity plan. Some animal or animal product related examples could include sale or distribution of compost, feed, or a petting zoo. Non-animal examples could include seed sales or a repair shop. Keep this in mind when completing the checklist and writing the biosecurity plan.

Acknowledgments

This Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Pork Production Biosecurity: Animals Raised Indoors was developed by the Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH), Iowa State University (ISU), College of Veterinary Medicine and representatives from the swine industry, state and federal agencies, and academia. This material was made possible, in part, by a Cooperative Agreement from the United States Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Additional funding was provided by the Pork Checkoff.

Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Pork Production Biosecurity: Animals Raised Indoors

Recommendations for Biosecurity

Each self-assessment checklist item has three possible responses, described below. Implementation of each component is essential to prevent virus entry and protect the health and well-being of the animals on the site.

- **In place**: All items are addressed in the biosecurity plan and are, or are capable of being, implemented on the pork production site as evidenced by visual inspection or by signed and/or dated documentation, as applicable, or as described.
- **In progress**: Some, but not all, of the items are addressed in the biosecurity plan and are, or are capable of being, implemented on the pork production site as evidenced by visual inspection or by signed and/or dated documentation, as applicable, or as described.
- **Not in place**: The items have not been addressed in the biosecurity plan or are not capable of being implemented on the pork production site.

1. Biosecurity Manager and Written Plan

A Biosecurity Manager is identified for the site. This individual is responsible for developing the biosecurity plan with the assistance of the herd veterinarian (if the Biosecurity Manager is not a veterinarian) and ensuring biosecurity training of, or communicating biosecurity measures with, all individuals who enter the site. The Biosecurity Manager has the written authority to ensure compliance with biosecurity protocols and take corrective action as needed.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

A site-specific, written, enhanced biosecurity plan has been developed and implemented by the Biosecurity Manager. It is reviewed at least annually and whenever the site goes through a change that affects biosecurity (expands, adds a new aspect of the business, etc.). The biosecurity plan clearly defines the scope of the operation and includes biosecurity for other susceptible species kept on the premises. The biosecurity plan includes a premises map labeled with the site entry, Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA), Line of Separation (LOS), access point(s), cleaning and disinfection (C&D) station(s), designated parking, and carcass disposal/pickup location. The map indicates vehicle movements (animal transport vehicles, deliveries, etc.) and carcass removal pathways. The Biosecurity Manager ensures that all individuals entering the site frequently (weekly or more often) have access to a copy of the biosecurity plan.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

2. Training

The Biosecurity Manager(s) and essential personnel are trained at least annually about the biosecurity measures necessary to keep an FAD out of the herd; training is documented. The Biosecurity Managers(s) informs individuals entering the site of the biosecurity measures they are to follow in a language they understand. Individuals are aware of the biosecurity concepts and procedures that apply to their specific areas of responsibility. The biosecurity plan describes the training required before entering this site.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

3. Protecting the Pig Herd

Site Entry

Entry to the pork production site is restricted by a limited number of entry points. Each entry point is protected with a gate or suitable barrier (e.g. cable) which is locked when the facility is not attended. If a locked barrier is not possible at the site entrance (such as when a house uses the same driveway), a barrier must be present restricting access of unauthorized vehicles to the pork production facilities within the site. Signage at the site entry conveys access is restricted.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Designated Parking Area

There is a clearly marked, designated parking area outside of the PBA, away from animal areas, for vehicles that will not enter the PBA and have not been cleaned and disinfected.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA)

The site has a PBA(s), which is established to serve as an outer control boundary around the buildings to limit movement of the virus near animal housing. The PBA is established so that individuals can perform duties within the PBA during the course of their daily tasks and so that routine deliveries occur outside of the PBA as much as possible. The PBA is clearly defined in the biosecurity plan and is clearly marked around animal buildings on the premises.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

PBA Access Point(s)

Entry to the PBA is restricted to a limited number of controlled PBA Access Points. Each PBA Access Point is clearly marked with a sign and protected with a suitable barrier (e.g. cable, gate, rope). Vehicles moving through the PBA Access Points must be cleaned to remove visible contamination and then disinfected. All individuals and equipment moving through PBA Access Points are required to follow specific biosecurity measures.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Cleaning and Disinfection (C&D) Station

There is an operational, clearly marked, and equipped C&D station with the means to remove visible contamination and then disinfect vehicles, equipment, and items needing to enter the PBA at a PBA Access Point. The C&D station is operated by individuals who have received documented training in proper selection and use of personal protective equipment and the principles of C&D. Runoff from the C&D station is managed following state and local regulations, ensuring it does not enter waterways, animal housing, or on-farm traffic areas. The biosecurity plan contains contingency plans for vehicle and equipment C&D in inclement weather.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Line of Separation (LOS)

The site has one or more LOS, which is established as a control boundary to prevent movement of virus into areas where susceptible animals can be exposed. In many situations, the walls of the building housing the animals form the LOS. The LOS is clearly defined in the biosecurity plan and is clearly marked on the premises. Animals, people, or items only cross the LOS through clearly marked and controlled LOS Access Points(s), following appropriate biosecurity measures. Areas

contaminated after loading/unloading animals are cleaned and disinfected according to the biosecurity plan.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

LOS Access Point(s)

Crossing the LOS is restricted to a limited number of controlled LOS Access Points. Each LOS Access Point is clearly marked with a sign in a language understood by all entering. Equipment, people, and items crossing through the LOS Access Points follow specific biosecurity measures. While the load-out area is a LOS Access Point, it should not serve as an entry point for personnel when possible. All movements (animals, equipment, people) across the LOS are recorded and available for review upon request.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Securing the Buildings

Buildings are locked when no one is present.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

4. Vehicles and Equipment

Vehicles and Equipment (non-animal transport)

All vehicles and equipment (not containing live animals) are cleaned and effectively disinfected prior to entering the PBA. Sharing of equipment with other sites is minimized.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Livestock Trucks/Trailers (Animal Transport Vehicles)

All empty animal transport vehicles that enter the PBA are effectively cleaned and disinfected prior to arrival at the site (outgoing loads) or before animals are loaded for delivery to the site (incoming loads).

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

5. Personnel

Prior to Arriving at the Site

Access is limited to individuals who are essential to the operation of the production site. Everyone crossing the LOS arrives at the site having showered and wearing clean clothing and footwear since last contacting susceptible animals. All individuals crossing the LOS have a signed agreement on file agreeing to follow these instructions.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Entry Logbook

Everyone crossing the LOS Access Point(s) completes the entry logbook, unless they are a scheduled worker. The entry logbook is monitored by an individual working on the site to ensure accurate completion. The contact information and work schedule records for workers are maintained.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Biosecure Entry/Exit Procedures

All individuals entering the PBA or crossing the LOS at a controlled Access Point follow a biosecure entry and exit procedure as specified in the biosecurity plan.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

6. Animal and Semen (if Applicable) Movement

Incoming Animals and Semen

Pigs and semen (if applicable) come from sources with documented, enhanced biosecurity practices and no current or recent evidence of an FAD infection. Semen is transported in containers whose exteriors can be cleaned and disinfected effectively to minimize the risk of virus transmission.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Pre-movement Isolation Period

No animals from a regulatory Control Area are introduced onto the site for at least 7 days prior to moving any animals to another pork production site with susceptible animals.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Contingency Plan for Interrupted Animal Movement

A plan exists to manage pigs in a biosecure manner on-site in the event animal movement is stopped for several weeks.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Loading Animals

Animals leaving the production site only move in one direction across the LOS at an Access Point at any one time. Areas contaminated by individuals or animals after loading/unloading are effectively cleaned and disinfected according to the biosecurity plan.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

7. Carcass Disposal

Dead animals are disposed of in a manner that prevents the attraction of wildlife, rodents, and other scavengers. Rendering trucks and other vehicles hauling dead animals to a common disposal site do not enter the PBA.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

8. Manure Management

Manure is stored and removed in a manner that prevents exposure of susceptible animals (either on or off the premises of origin) to disease agents and meets state, local, and Responsible Regulatory Officials' requirements.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

A plan exists for storing manure on-site in the event it cannot be permitted to move off-site during an outbreak.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

9. Rodent, Fly, Wildlife, and Other Animal Control

Rodent and Fly Control

Written rodent and fly control programs are in place and implementation is documented.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Wildlife and Other Animal Control

Facilities are designed and maintained to inhibit all animals, including birds, from crossing the LOS and contacting pigs.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

10. Feed

Grain and feed are delivered, stored, mixed, and fed in a manner that minimizes contamination. Feed spills are cleaned up promptly and disposed of to avoid attracting wildlife.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Comments

Please send comments or suggested edits for improvement to: spsinfo@iastate.edu

Additional Resources

The Secure Pork Supply website has additional resources available at: www.securepork.org

Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Pork Production Biosecurity: Animals with Outdoor Access

September 2019

Indoor vs. Outdoor Biosecurity Checklist

Production sites with pigs that remain inside a building with a roof and walls (including curtain walls with screens) that exclude birds and other wildlife use the **Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Pork Production Biosecurity: Animals Raised Indoors**. (Pigs on these sites may only have outdoor access when being moved between buildings.) Other production sites that do not fit these criteria should **use this checklist** for animals with outdoor access.

Target Audience

This checklist and corresponding Information Manual for Enhanced Biosecurity are written for pork production sites where the animals are raised outdoors or have access to outdoor lots. The biosecurity measures apply to:

- Sites with pigs raised with access to the outdoors, including sites with other susceptible species (e.g. cattle, sheep, and goats) kept on the premises.
- All individuals delivering to, servicing, or working on the site including family members and/or non-family employees responsible for animal care and husbandry.
- Pigs on sites that have **never been infected with or vaccinated for** foot and mouth disease (FMD), classical swine fever (CSF), and African swine fever (ASF).

Introduction

In the event of a foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak in the United States (U.S.), maintaining business continuity for the pork industry is critical to the agricultural economy, food security, as well as animal health and well-being. The goal of the Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan is to provide a workable business continuity plan for pork producers that have pigs with no evidence of the FAD infection and associated industries that is credible to Responsible Regulatory Officials (local, state, tribal, and federal officials, as appropriate). In an actual FAD outbreak, decisions will be made by Responsible Regulatory Officials based on the unique characteristics of each outbreak.

During an FAD outbreak, it is the producer's responsibility to keep their animals from becoming infected, focusing on what they can control on their site. Biosecurity approaches are both structural and operational. Structural biosecurity is built into the physical construction and maintenance of a facility. Operational biosecurity involves management practices designed to prevent the introduction and spread of disease agents onto or off of the production site. An FAD will test the effectiveness of operational biosecurity practices because successful implementation of these practices depends on the awareness and behavior of individuals on the site.

The three foreign animal diseases of concern for the SPS Plan are 1) foot and mouth disease (FMD), 2) African swine fever (ASF), and 3) classical swine fever (CSF), also known as hog cholera. All three diseases are highly contagious and have a high impact on animal health and international trade; however, none of these diseases pose a food safety or public health concern.

Existing biosecurity plans for pork production sites may offer protection against endemic diseases but heightened precautions are needed for FADs. The enhanced biosecurity recommendations outlined in this document are based on the known exposure routes for the three FADs of concern. Operations with susceptible species raised with access to the outdoors may have more difficulty preventing an FAD exposure depending on their proximity to infected premises and the presence of wildlife in the area. This document emphasizes four concepts that all pork production sites with animals that have access to the outdoors should implement to help protect their animals from endemic diseases and to be prepared in the event of an FAD outbreak in the U.S.:

1. A Biosecurity Manager,
2. A written site-specific enhanced biosecurity plan,
3. A defined Perimeter Buffer Area, and
4. Defined Lines of Separation.

This enhanced biosecurity checklist and the corresponding Information Manual for Enhanced Biosecurity can be used to develop a site-specific, written, enhanced biosecurity plan. All pork production sites must designate a Biosecurity Manager; this is item number 1 in the checklist below. The Biosecurity Manager develops the enhanced biosecurity plan PRIOR TO an outbreak; the plan addresses items 2-10 on this checklist. The biosecurity plan describes the scope of the operation, contains forms for documentation of training and signatures, explanations of procedures and signage used on the premises, and protocols written and communicated effectively in languages that are fully understood by the individuals responsible for implementation.

The biosecurity plan should describe the strategy for how each item could be implemented (supplies needed, changes in management practices, etc.). A majority of the biosecurity measures in the biosecurity checklist should be implemented even in the absence of an FAD outbreak to prevent entry and spread of domestic diseases. If producers have not implemented all of the items in the biosecurity checklist (such as a Cleaning & Disinfection Station) prior to the outbreak, they should implement them immediately when an FAD is detected in the U.S., Mexico, or Canada. If their production site is located in an FAD Control Area, Responsible Regulatory Officials will likely require that all of the items on the checklist, and possibly others, be implemented before animal movement is permitted.

Scope of Biosecurity Plan

Each premises must have its own biosecurity plan. Begin by defining your premises, clearly describing the animals (all species) and animal housing (buildings, pastures, and dry lots etc.) associated with the premises. The animal housing should be described including seasonal changes such as movements from a pasture to a building with an outdoor lot as the seasons change. Animals connected to the operation but reared at another site and accessed via a public road may be considered a separate premises, have a separate Premises Identification Number (PIN), and therefore, a separate biosecurity plan. Biosecurity plans for premises owned/managed similarly may have significant overlap. A PIN will be required to request movement permits during an outbreak. A PIN includes a valid 911 address and a set of matching coordinates (latitude and longitude) reflecting the actual location of the animals on the premises. Request a PIN from the office of your State Animal Health Official (www.aphis.usda.gov/aphis/ourfocus/animalhealth/traceability/state-pin).

Other businesses, animal or non-animal related, operated from the same premises should also be accounted for in the biosecurity plan. Some animal or animal product related examples could include sale or distribution of compost, feed, or a petting zoo. Non-animal examples could include seed sales or a repair shop. Keep this in mind when completing the checklist and writing the biosecurity plan.

Acknowledgments

This Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Pork Production Biosecurity: Animals with Outdoor Access was developed by the Center for Food Security and Public Health (CFSPH), Iowa State University (ISU), College of Veterinary Medicine and representatives from the swine industry, state and federal agencies, and academia. This material was made possible, in part, by a Cooperative Agreement from the United States Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS). Additional funding was provided by the Pork Checkoff.

Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Pork Production Biosecurity: Animals with Outdoor Access

Recommendations for Biosecurity

Each self-assessment checklist item has three possible responses, described below. Implementation of each component is essential to prevent virus entry and protect the health and well-being of the animals on the site.

- **In place**: All items are addressed in the biosecurity plan and are, or are capable of being, implemented on the pork production site as evidenced by visual inspection or by signed and/or dated documentation, as applicable, or as described.
- **In progress**: Some, but not all, of the items are addressed in the biosecurity plan and are, or are capable of being, implemented on the pork production site as evidenced by visual inspection or by signed and/or dated documentation, as applicable, or as described.
- **Not in place**: The items have not been addressed in the biosecurity plan or are not capable of being implemented on the pork production site.

1. Biosecurity Manager and Written Plan

A Biosecurity Manager is identified for the site. This individual is responsible for developing the biosecurity plan with the assistance of the herd veterinarian (if the Biosecurity Manager is not a veterinarian) and ensuring biosecurity training of, or communicating biosecurity measures with, all individuals who enter the site. The Biosecurity Manager has the written authority to ensure compliance with biosecurity protocols and take corrective action as needed.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

A site-specific, written, enhanced biosecurity plan has been developed by the Biosecurity Manager. It is reviewed at least annually and whenever the site goes through a change that affects biosecurity (expands, adds a new aspect of the business, etc.). The biosecurity plan clearly defines the scope of the operation and includes biosecurity for other susceptible species kept on the premises. The biosecurity plan includes a premises map labeled with the site entry, Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA) when applicable, Line(s) of Separation (LOS), access point(s), cleaning and disinfection (C&D) station(s), designated parking, and carcass disposal/pickup location. The map indicates vehicle movements (animal transport vehicles, deliveries, etc.) and carcass removal pathways. The Biosecurity Manager ensures that all individuals entering the site frequently (weekly or more often) have access to a copy of the biosecurity plan. The Biosecurity Manager is capable of implementing all the biosecurity measures included in the written plan if an FAD is diagnosed in the U.S.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

2. Training

The Biosecurity Manager(s) and essential personnel are trained at least annually about the biosecurity measures necessary to keep an FAD out of the herd; training is documented. The Biosecurity Manager(s) informs individuals entering the site of the biosecurity measures they are to follow in a language they understand. Individuals are aware of the biosecurity concepts and procedures that apply to their specific areas of responsibility. The biosecurity plan describes the training required before entering this site.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

3. Protecting the Pig Herd

Designated Parking Area

There is a clearly marked, designated parking area outside of the PBA (or LOS when PBA not present), away from animal areas, for vehicles that will not enter the PBA or cross the LOS and have not been cleaned and disinfected.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Perimeter Buffer Area (PBA)

The site has a PBA(s), which is established to serve as an outer control boundary around the buildings and animal pens to limit movement of the virus near animals. The PBA is established so that individuals can perform duties within the PBA during the course of their daily tasks and so that routine deliveries occur outside of the PBA as much as possible. The PBA is clearly defined in the biosecurity plan and is clearly marked around animal housing on the premises. Establishing a PBA around animals on pasture may not be possible. In that case, removing animals from pastures after an FAD outbreak anywhere in the U.S. would help protect them from becoming infected.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

PBA Access Point(s)

Entry to the PBA is restricted to a limited number of controlled PBA Access Points. Each PBA Access Point is clearly marked with a sign and protected with a suitable barrier (e.g. cable, gate, rope). Vehicles moving through the PBA Access Points must be cleaned to remove visible contamination and then disinfected. All individuals and equipment moving through PBA Access Points are required to follow specific biosecurity measures.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Cleaning and Disinfection (C&D) Station

There is one or more operational, clearly marked, and equipped C&D station ready to be used in the event of an FAD outbreak. The C & D station has the means to remove visible contamination and then disinfect vehicles, equipment, and items needing to enter the PBA at a PBA Access Point. The C&D station is operated by individuals who have received documented training in proper selection and use of personal protective equipment and the principles of C&D. Runoff from the C&D station is managed in a manner that prevents exposure of susceptible animals (either on or off the premises of origin) to disease agents and meets state and local environmental regulations. Care should be taken to ensure it does not enter waterways, animal housing, or on-farm traffic areas. The biosecurity plan contains contingency plans for vehicle and equipment C&D in inclement weather.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Line of Separation (LOS)

The biosecurity plan includes one or more LOS. These lines establish a control boundary around, or within, the premises to limit movement of virus into areas where susceptible animals can be exposed. The LOS is clearly defined in the biosecurity plan and is clearly marked on the premises. Animals, vehicles, people, or items only cross the LOS through clearly marked and controlled LOS Access Points(s), following appropriate biosecurity measures. Pigs are prevented from nose-to-nose contact with livestock on adjacent premises or with pets and wildlife, especially feral swine. Pigs do not have access to streams, waterways, or run-off water that may have come from other premises.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Maximize Distance between Susceptible Livestock on Adjacent Premises

The distance is maximized between susceptible livestock on adjacent premises, and steps to do so have been coordinated with owners/operators of these premises.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

LOS Access Point(s)

Entry to the operation is restricted to a limited number of controlled LOS Access Points. These LOS Access Points are protected with a suitable barrier (e.g. gate, cable, rope) to prevent unauthorized vehicles from entering. Each LOS Access Point is clearly marked with a sign in a language understood by all entering. Vehicles moving through an LOS Access Point are cleaned to remove visible contamination and then properly disinfected. People, and items crossing through the LOS Access Points follow specific biosecurity measures. While the load-out area is a LOS Access Point, it should not serve as an entry point for personnel when possible. All movements (animals, vehicles, equipment, people) across the LOS are recorded and available for review upon request. Deliveries not essential to the operation are made outside the LOS at a designated area indicated on the premises map.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

4. Vehicles and Equipment

Vehicles and Equipment (non-animal transport)

All vehicles and equipment (not containing live animals) are cleaned and effectively disinfected prior to entering the PBA or LOS, otherwise entry is prohibited. Sharing of equipment with other sites is minimized.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Livestock Trucks/Trailers (Animal Transport Vehicles)

All empty animal transport vehicles that enter the PBA or cross the LOS are effectively cleaned and disinfected prior to arrival at the site (outgoing loads) or before animals are loaded for delivery to the site (incoming loads).

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

5. Personnel

Prior to Arriving at the Site

Access is limited to individuals who are essential to the operation of the production site. Everyone crossing the LOS on foot or exiting their vehicle inside the LOS arrives at the site having showered and wearing clean clothing and footwear since last contacting susceptible animals. All individuals crossing the LOS have a signed agreement on file agreeing to follow these instructions.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Entry Logbook

Everyone crossing the LOS Access Point(s) completes the entry logbook, unless they are a scheduled worker. The entry logbook is monitored by an individual working on the site to ensure accurate completion. The contact information and work schedule records for workers are maintained.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Biosecure Entry/Exit Procedures

All individuals entering the PBA, or who cross an LOS Access Point on foot or exit their vehicle inside the LOS ensure that visible contamination on their footwear, clothing or exposed skin does not enter or exit the operation, following the biosecure entry and exit procedure as specified in the biosecurity plan.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

6. Animal and Semen (if Applicable) Movement

Incoming Animals and Semen

Pigs and semen (if applicable) come from sources with documented, enhanced biosecurity practices and no current or previous evidence of an FAD infection. Semen is transported in containers whose exteriors can be cleaned and disinfected effectively to minimize the risk of virus transmission.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Pre-movement Isolation Period

No animals from a regulatory Control Area are introduced onto the site for at least 7 days prior to moving any animals to another pork production site with susceptible animals.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Contingency Plan for Interrupted Animal Movement

A plan exists to manage pigs in a biosecure manner on-site in the event animal movement is stopped for several weeks.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Loading Animals

Animals leaving the production site only move in one direction across the LOS at an Access Point at any one time. Areas contaminated by individuals or animals after loading/unloading are effectively cleaned and disinfected according to the biosecurity plan.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

7. Carcass Disposal

Dead animals are disposed of in a manner that prevents the attraction of wildlife, rodents, and other scavengers. Rendering trucks and other vehicles hauling dead animals to a common disposal site do not enter the PBA or cross into the LOS.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

8. Manure Management

Manure is stored and removed in a manner that prevents exposure of susceptible animals (either on or off the premises of origin) to disease agents and meets state, local, and Responsible Regulatory Officials' requirements.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

A plan exists for storing manure on-site in the event it cannot be permitted to move off-site during an outbreak.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

9. Rodent, Fly, Wildlife, and Other Animal Control

Rodent and Fly Control

Written rodent and fly control programs are in place and implementation is documented.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Wildlife and Other Animal Control

Control measures are in place to limit interaction between pigs and other animals (deer, feral pigs, rodents, raccoons, dogs, cats, etc.)

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

10. Feed

Grain and feed are delivered, stored, mixed, and fed in a manner that minimizes contamination. Feed spills are cleaned up promptly and disposed of to avoid attracting wildlife.

☐ In place ☐ In progress ☐ Not in place

Comments

Please send comments or suggested edits for improvement to: spsinfo@iastate.edu

Additional Resources

The Secure Pork Supply website has additional resources available at: www.securepork.org

Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan

Practice Questionnaire for Foreign Animal Disease Exposure

During a foot and mouth disease (FMD), classical swine fever (CSF), or African swine fever (ASF) outbreak, producers in a regulatory Control Area will need to provide information to Regulatory Officials about 1) any unusual health events or possible clinical signs of FMD, CSF, or ASF in their animals; 2) biosecurity steps put in place to prevent exposure to the disease; and 3) possible direct or indirect contact with other animals or operations that may have infected animals. The information you provide is critical to determine the scope and extent of the outbreak. However, it can be daunting to provide a lot of detail on short notice.

This document provides a short example of the type of information that may be requested. Additional steps from the Secure Pork Supply (SPS) Plan will need to be completed in order to request an animal or animal product (semen) movement permit.

National Premises Identification Number (Prem ID or PIN):_____Date: _____

Premises Name _____

Premises Address: _____
Street City County State Zip Code

Premises GPS Coordinates: Latitude_____Longitude_____

Name of person filling out this questionnaire: _____

Contact information (phone and email): _____

Owner Name (if different from above):_____

Contact information (phone and email): _____

DISEASE MONITORING (SURVEILLANCE)

1. Have samples from the animals on this premises been submitted to a diagnostic laboratory to test for a foreign animal disease (FAD) such as FMD, CSF, or ASF? ☐ Yes ☐ No

   If YES and the results were positive, then this premises is considered an Infected Premises and you will be given specific guidance on next steps from officials managing the outbreak.
   If YES and the results are negative, or if NO, please complete the questions below.

2. Are you looking at the animals on your premises as described in the Secure Pork Supply Active Observational Surveillance documents? ☐ Yes ☐ No

   If YES, continue answer the questions below. If NO, please read the Active Observational Surveillance materials then return to answering the rest of the questions.

3. Do the animals on this premises have any
   a. unexplained or unusual clinical signs? ☐ Yes ☐ No
   b. clinical signs that may be caused by an FAD infection? ☐ Yes ☐ No
   c. unexplained mortalities OR increase in mortalities? ☐ Yes ☐ No
   d. unexplained changes in production parameters such as feed intake? ☐ Yes ☐ No

During an actual FAD outbreak, producers should observe animals daily for signs of infection, record their findings or the lack thereof, and promptly report any abnormal findings to officials managing the outbreak.

BIOSECURITY

4. Do you have a Biosecurity Manager(s) for this premises? ☐ Yes ☐ No

   If YES, please list their name(s) and contact information (phone and email):

   _____

   _____

5. Does your site-specific biosecurity plan describe how you have implemented, or will implement, each item in the enhanced biosecurity checklist in the event of an FAD outbreak? ☐ Yes ☐ No
6. On this site, has anyone carried pork products into animal areas? ☐ Yes ☐ No

   If YES, please list date (if known) in which event might have occurred: _____

   If NO to questions #4 or #5, please read the Biosecurity materials at www.securepork.org.

CONTACT WITH OTHER PREMISES

This section of the document reviews the types of external contacts that may expose your animals. Producers should practice **recording external contacts over the past 7 days** to get a feel for the information that will be needed in an outbreak. During an actual outbreak, Regulatory Officials may ask to review records from the past 28 days.

7. Has this premises been exposed to **manure from another premises** (applied on the ground near areas where animals are housed or graze)? ☐ Yes ☐ No

   If YES, please list the premises names, contact information (phone or email), and date (if known) from which manure originated or the company that hauled the manure _____

   _____

8. Has this premises received **live animals**? ☐ Yes ☐ No

   If YES, please list premises names, contact information (phone, email), and date (if known) from which live animals were received _____

   _____

9. Has this premises moved **live animals** to another premises (e.g., production site, buying station, packing plant)? ☐ Yes ☐ No
   If YES, please list premises names, contact information (phone, email), and date (if known) _____

   _____

10. Has this premises received **semen**? ☐ Yes ☐ No

    If YES, please list premises names, contact information (phone, email), and date (if known) from which semen were received_____

    _____

11. Has this premises moved **semen** to another premises? ☐ Yes ☐ No

    If YES, please list premises names, contact information (phone, email), and date (if known) where semen was sent_____

    _____

12. Have **feed trucks** arrived on this premises after delivering feed to other premises but without cleaning undercarriage? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ I don't know

    If YES, please list premises names, contact information (phone, email), and date (if known)_____

    _____

13. Has this premises used or had contact with **equipment** used on another premises with live or dead animals, manure, or animal products (semen)?

    ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ I don't know

    Examples may include:

    - Trucks/trailers used to transport live animals
    - Gates/panels/animal handling equipment
    - Manure handling/hauling/application equipment
    - Rendering or compost handling/hauling/application equipment
    - Skid-steers, tractors, loaders
    - Vaccination supplies (syringe guns, coolers, etc.)
    - Pressure sprayers/washers
    - Coolers, semen containers
    - Any shared equipment

    If YES, please list premises names and contact information (phone, email) from which the equipment came

    _____

    _____

    _____

14. Has anyone on this premises had contact with **live or dead animals, manure, or animal products** (semen) that could have been infected with FMD, CSF, or ASF? ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ I don't know

Exposure may occur through the following activities:

- International travel
- Caring for other animals
- Contact with wildlife, including hunting
- Working at other animal production premises
- Living or associating with someone who works at other premises with animals that can get the same FAD
- Visiting other premises with animals that can get the same FAD, including livestock markets, fairgrounds, zoos
- Visiting a processing plant, rendering plant, or landfill
- Other contact with infected animals or infectious materials

15. Have any of the following animals been seen on the premises or around animal buildings the last 7 days?

Note: During an actual outbreak, Regulatory Officials may ask to see records for 28 days.
(Mark all that apply)

Animal Type	**Yes**	**No**	**I don't know**
Cattle			
Chickens or other poultry			
Horses, donkeys, mules, etc.			
Pigs (feral)			
Sheep, Goats			
Dogs (domestic or feral)			
Cats (domestic or feral)			
Deer, elk			
Coyotes, foxes, raccoons			
Rodents (rats, mice)			
Other (describe) _____			

For more information on the Secure Pork Supply Plan, please visit www.securepork.org

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